Lindstedt v. Baum, et. al.

Revised Statute of Missouri (RSMo) 115.333  ............. 6, 7, Exhibit #5

Revised Statute of Missouri 115.361 ........................ 3, Exhibit #5

Revised Statute of Missouri 115.363 ...................  6, 13, Exhibit #5

Revised Statute of Missouri 115.367 .....................   13, Exhibit #5

Revised Statute of Missouri 115.377 ......................   6, Exhibit #5

Revised Statute of Missouri 115.615 ................................     5


OTHER AUTHORITIES

1st Amendment, U.S. Constitution ..............................  3, 11, 12

14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution .............................. 3, 11, 12

Art. 4 § 4 of the U.S. Constitution ..............................   3, 12

(Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 
   defn.: Republican government)  .................................. 3, 13


RULES:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 8(a)(e)(f) ..............    1

Federal Rules Civil Proc., Rule 59 ..............................  1, 5, 8

Federal Rules Civil Proc., Rule 60 ............................... 1, 5, 8












Lindstedt v. Baum, Appeal #97-2892       iv             Appellant’s Brief
_________________________________________________________________________

                    Preliminary Statement


   This is an appeal from a decision rendered by Judge D. Brook 

Bartlett of the United States District Court for the Western District 

of Missouri.  Judge Bartlett's decision dated April 28, 1997 was to 

dismiss, apparently with prejudice, Appellant/Plaintiff's suit against 

Defendants Kay Baum, Newton County Clerk, Rebecca M. Cook, Secretary of

State for Missouri, and the State of Missouri.  Since this is an 

election case, the District Court was vested with jurisdiction to hear 

these claims by 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343.

   Appellant/Plaintiff submitted a Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motion to 

Reconsider on May 8, 1997.  On June 4, 1997, Judge Bartlett denied said 

motion. Appellant on July 3, 1997 filed in forma pauperis a Notice of 

Appeal.

   This Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
















________________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    1    Appellant's Brief

                     Statement of Issues

   Appellant/Plaintiff presents five issues for review:

1. Whether the District Court properly granted a dismissal, with or 

without prejudice, as to whether Plaintiff did indeed claim a proper 

cause of action. Plaintiff says that he did indeed allege an abundance 

of facts and law to state his claim and that he was cut off from 

bringing up more facts by the District Court's dismissal before discovery

took place.

   Hishon v. King and Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct 2229, 2232

   Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99

   Leatherman v. Tarrant County Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 
   ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1160

   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 8(a)(e)(f)

2. Even if the District Court believed that Appellant/Plaintiff failed to

state a complaint upon which relief could be granted, that district court 

should have allowed Appellant an opportunity to amend the complaint in

greater specificity to please even a "heightened pleading standard" 

rather than take it upon itself to redefine, then demolish Appellant's 

pleading.

   Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 672

   Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d. 81

   Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254

3. The District Court dismissed Appellant's suit by improperly using the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 

44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983).   This doctrine was improperly 

applied because Appellant never did get a fair hearing on his cause's 

merits in the Missouri court system, but was only denied mandamus. Also, 

in the matter of election cases, the federal court system seldom applies 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as the government body is not trusted to 

solely judge the constitutionality or enforcement of its election 

statutes.

   Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F. 3d 1491, 1495 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996)

_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    2    Appellant's Brief

   Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059 

   Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1990)

   Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981

4. Appellant/Plaintiff contends that his First and Fourteenth Amendment 

Rights have been violated by Appellees/Defendants' refusal to place his 

name on the ballot once Appellant had secured his political party's

nomination to run in the general election.  Appellant has never, ever, 

in either the state or federal courts been given a chance to bring up 

this issue.  The District Court should not have dismissed Appellant's 

case.

   Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 112 S.Ct. 1992

   Illinois Bd. of Elections v.Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173

   Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564

   State ex. rel. Coker-Garcia v. Blunt, 849 S.W.2d 81

   1st Amendment U.S. Constitution

   14th Amendment U.S. Constitution

5.   Art. 4  4 of the U.S. Constitution guarantees "to every State in 

this Union a Republican Form of Government."  A Republican form of 

government has been defined as being by representatives chosen by the 

people.  (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Republican government).  

If Missouri election officials are to usurp this function by using their 

office and power to regulate elections to instead refuse to allow 

candidates to run for public office by refusing to place them on the 

ballot, then it is a duty of the federal court system to guarantee a 

republican form of government when it has the authority and opportunity 

to do so.

   Baker v. Carr, 269 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691

   New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2432, 2433 (1922)

   Art. 4  4 of the U.S. Constitution

   (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Republican government).

6. Election statutes are not to be tailored for the express purpose 

of aiding the major political parties and candidates while hampering 

minor political parties and their candidates.  State and local 

election officials and state courts have no authority to so 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    3    Appellant's Brief

construe such state election laws so as to aid major political parties 

and their candidates and hinder minor political parties and their 

candidates.

   Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564

   Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5

   U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842
















_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    4    Appellant's Brief

                    Statement of the Case
                              
   The case before this Court is an election case.

   Appellant/Plaintiff when he was reforming the Newton County 

Libertarian Party (NCLP) after the primary election had elected 

precinct committeemen noticed that the Missouri election laws governing 

nominating committees of established political parties was rather 

liberal in its allowing the replacement by nominating committee of 

deceased, withdrawn or disqualified candidates.  Since the Libertarian 

Party in Missouri does not have as many candidates as the major party

Democrats and Republicans, for whom these election laws were crafted, and 

in the absence of a statute forbidding the practice, as re-elected 

chairman Appellant convened a nominating committee and had himself 

nominated to run in the general election for chairman.  Appellant obeyed 

all the election laws and presented himself as a Libertarian candidate 

for Sheriff to Appellee/Defendant election officials.  These election 

officials refused to obey Missouri election statute and put Appellant's 

name on the county general election ballot.  Appellant went through the

Missouri court system seeking a writ of mandamus to make election 

officials obey their election laws.  Appellant was refused his writ and 

his request for judicial review was ignored by Missouri court system.  

Appellant/Plaintiff brought suit to the U.S. District Court, Western 

District of Missouri in forma pauperis.  Plaintiff's suit was allowed to

continue until Judge Bartlett dismissed the suit on April 28, 1997, 

apparently with prejudice.  Plaintiff made a FRCP Rule 59 and 60 Motion 

to Reconsider Order. Judge Bartlett denied said motion on June 4, 1997. 

On July 3, 1997 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in forma pauperis.  

This matter is now before this Appellate Court for review.



   Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
                              
   On August 20, 1996, after reorganizing the Newton County Libertarian 

Party in accordance with Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo) 115.615 

and upon reelection as county chairman of said political organization, 

Appellant/Plaintiff suggested that a nominating committee be formed of 

every single one of the county committee members 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892   5      Appellant's Brief

and that Appellant be nominated to run for the office of sheriff.

When committee members wondered aloud whether such an arrangement was 

"legal," Appellant assured them that it was not expressly forbidden by 

Missouri election law, and was probably permissible under RSMo 115.363 

Sections 2, 3, and 4 (See Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit #5) which pertain 

to political party nominating committees nominating new candidates to 

fill vacancies left by death, withdrawal, or removal from the ballot by 

election authority.  These rules were designed to help the major parties 

field new candidates for office while discriminating against minor new 

parties who do not have enough candidates or organization to fill all 

vacancies. Since it was felt that nominating Appellant to run for 

sheriff would not hurt, Appellant was duly nominated.

   On August 27, 1996, Appellant announced his intentions at Defendant 

Baum's county clerk's office. On August 30, 1997, Appellant presented a 

certificate of nomination under RSMo 115.377 and asked to be placed upon 

the ballot as a candidate for the office of Sheriff of Newton County

Missouri on the Libertarian ballot.

   On September 12, 1996, Appellant petitioned Defendant Baum for her 

statement under provision of RSMo 115.333(1) (See Appendix & Addendum, 

Exhibit #5) for refusing to place his name on the ballot.  Defendant Baum 

informed Appellant orally that she had asked the Newton County 

Prosecutor, Greg Bridges for such a statement, but that he had refused 

to give her one.  Prosecutor Bridges told Baum only to refuse to place 

Appellant's name on the ballot. Defendant Baum also asked the chief 

election official in Missouri, Defendant Secretary of State Rebecca M. 

Cook for the RSMo 115.333 statement, but that Defendant Cook consulted 

with her lawyers, gotten a refusal to provide the RSMo 115.333 statement, 

and had also told Defendant Baum not to place Appellant on the ballot.

   Having understood that Defendants Baum and Cook, under advice of 

their lawyers, would refuse to obey their own election law, Appellant 

filed for a writ of mandamus as provided for by RSMo 115.333 Section 2 

(See Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit #5) on September 17, 1997 before 

the Newton County circuit court.  Appellant raised all the relevant 

state statutes, state constitutional, and federal constitutional 

issues in his petition for mandamus.  Prosecutor Bridges filed a 

response and motion to dismiss Appellant's 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum  et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    6    Appellant's Brief

petition on Sept. 23, 1996. In Appellant's opinion, Prosecutor Bridges 

misquoted both fact and state election law. Appellant was not an 

independent candidate nor was the Newton County Libertarian Party a new 

political party.  Appellant filed well within any deadlines set by 

RSMo. Chapter 115.  Circuit judge Timothy Perigo asserted that RSMo 

115.333 did not apply, that his court was "prohibited by State law from 

granting Relator's requested relief" and denied Appellant's petition for 

writ of mandamus.

   On October 4, 1996, in accordance with RSMo 115.333 Section 2, 

Appellant filed for a petition for writ of mandamus before the Missouri 

Supreme Court.  Appellant also asked for a judicial review of election 

laws in order to determine why Appellant was not being allowed to run on 

the ballot.  The Missouri Supreme Court, violating the provisions of 

RSMo 115.333 which gave them jurisdiction, their own case law, and the 

Constitution of Missouri, insisted that Appellant file in the Missouri 

appellate court, Southern Division.  Appellant refiled essentially the 

same paperwork before that appellate court and was denied his petition 

by that court on Oct. 10, 1996.  This Missouri appellate court treated 

Appellant's filings as a mere writ of mandamus, and refused to state any 

findings of fact or conclusions of law behind their denial.  On Oct. 11, 

1997, the Missouri Supreme Court grabbed back jurisdiction before 

Appellant could reapply for a hearing under RSMo 115.333.  On Oct. 18, 

1996, the day after Appellant mailed an amended petition for judicial 

review of election laws and two days before the Oct. 20 deadline to 

resubmit pleadings, the Missouri Supreme Court entered the following:

      Now at this day, on consideration of the petition for
      writ of mandamus and judicial review of election laws, 
      herein to the said respondents, it is ordered by the 
      court here that the said petition be, and the same is 
      denied.

   This order is essentially the same as that of the Missouri Court of 

Appeals -- Southern District.  It professes to have considered the 

petition for judicial review of election laws, but is treated essentially 

as a mere petitionfor writ of mandamus with the only written opinion 

necessary being a mere denial. (See Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit #6)

   On October 25, 1996, Appellant inquired of the Missouri Supreme 

Court whether or when it would rule on the part of Appellant's 

petition for review of election law.  On 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    7      Appellant's Brief

November 4, 1996, a deputy clerk wrote back that the Supreme Court's

ruling was final -- without informing Appellant as to what exactly had 

been actually ruled upon -- the petition for mandamus or for judicial 

review. (See Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit #7)

   On October 28, 1996, Appellant filed in forma pauperis before the 

U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri a civil complaint 

regarding this matter.

   On November 5, 1996, Appellant as a write-in candidate overwhelmingly 

lost the election to the Republican party incumbent. Appellant has talked 

with a number of voters who claimed to have voted for Appellant who 

mistook him for his brother, on the ballot as a Libertarian Party 

candidate for county commissioner. Also, in most precincts, the list of

acceptable write-in candidates were not posted at the polling places. 

Because of  the election official Defendants not obeying their own 

election laws, and the Missouri court system refusing to grant Appellant 

due process of law, Appellant suffered grievous harm to his election 

chances as a candidate for sheriff.

   On December 3, 1997 the U.S. District Court allowed Appellant to 

proceed on his case in forma pauperis.

   Appellee/Defendant election officials filed Motions to Dismiss which 

Appellant answered.  There was to be a proposed Scheduling Order and 

Discovery Plan which both sides were working on when Judge Bartlett 

granted Appellee/Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on April 28, 1997.

   Appellant submitted a FRCP Rule 59 and 60 Motion to Reconsider Order 

on May 8, 1997.  Judge Bartlett denied said motion on June 4, 1997.  On 

July 3, 1997 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in forma pauperis.  This 

matter is now before this Appellate Court for review.









_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    7      Appellant's Brief

                          ARGUMENT
                              
1. The District Court ignored Hishon v. King and Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 

73, 104 S.Ct 2229, 2232 in that "all factual allegations in the Complaint 

are to be taken as true as well as all inferences that reasonably may be 

drawn from these facts." The facts concerning what happened are pretty 

well cut and dried, having been documented in a paper trail left by 

Appellant/Plaintiff in his battle with Appellee/Defendants against their 

Motions to Dismiss.  The state statutes which Appellees/Defendants 

disobeyed are still on the books. Therefore, upon the material facts

already present before discovery proceeded Plaintiff did indeed state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted well within the dictates of 

Hishon.

   The District Court acknowledged Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (See 

pages 2-3 of Order of April 28) in that "a complaint should not be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no sets of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 45-46.  There most certainly

are no shortage of facts in this matter.  Instead, the District Court 

seems to have chosen to assist defense counsel in playing "a game of 

skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome" 

and refusing to "accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to

facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley at 48.

   The District Court did not bring up Leatherman v. Tarrant County 

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1160 wherein 

it was held that a federal court may not apply a "heightened pleading 

standard" for monetary damages. This decision went on to reconfirm 

Conley v. Gibson, and said that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)

meant exactly what it said.  Appellant is not sure whether he will be 

allowed by the federal courts to sue for monetary damages or even a 

reimbursement of his legal expenses pursuing this election case.  This 

case is not a civil rights violation case under 42 U.S.C.  1983, but even

if it was or even had some elements of a civil rights case in seeking 

damages, a "heightened pleading standard" should not be demanded by a 

federal court of Appellant/Plaintiff.


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    9      Appellant's Brief

2. The District Court should not have violated both case law and Federal

rules of Civil Procedure to render a decision to dismiss Plaintiff's 

suit for a supposed "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted." Even if this Court thought it could somehow justify such a 

notion, it should have pointed out where Plaintiff failed to show

specificity and allowed Plaintiff to amend complaint rather than leave 

this matter for this Appellate Court to do so.  Frey v. City of 

Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 672.  But yet the District Court chose not to 

give Plaintiff any such chance.

   Rather the District Court chose to playfully use Ketchum v. City of 

West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d. 81, 83 to redefine, then demolish, 

Appellant/Plaintiff's pleadings.  Appellant has no objection to a judge 

arguing his case provided the judge wins it for him.  However, Judge 

Bartlett acting as Plaintiff's lawyer was unsuccessful before Judge 

Bartlett because Plaintiff's case was dismissed by Judge Bartlett acting 

as Judge Bartlett.  If this Appellate Court is to use its 1992 Ketchum 

case as an opportunity to review the District Court's holding de novo, 

(Ibid, 83) then Appellant wishes for better luck in the quality of 

argumentation this time.  However, it would probably be best if Appellant 

were allowed to proceed pro se and to do his own pleading, even if it 

becomes necessary to read this Plaintiff's complaint "with the indulgence 

due pro se complaints". Id. 82.

   Appellant/Plaintiff thinks he has already made sufficient factual 

allegations in his original complaint and subsequent motions.  If that 

is not the case, however, Plaintiff thinks that he should be the one to 

amend his complaint, especially since it will be Plaintiff who will be

collecting facts in the discovery process.  "If it appears that the 

[pro se] complaintant could, after discovery, offer facts which would 

validate the complaint, sua sponte dismissal is premature." Munz v. 

Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1257.

3. The District Court relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in large 

part to dismiss Appellant/Plaintiff's lawsuit. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). 

   As far as the District Court's interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman
 
doctrine, "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in federal 

court is a question of law subject to de 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    10     Appellant's Brief

novo review" as well by this Appellate Court.  Keene Corp. v. Cass, 

908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1990), Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 

47 F.3d 981.

   Also, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in the absence of 

any state court decision. All the state court system did was to refuse 

to rule on Plaintiff's case using any excuse they thought could pass 

muster. (See Appellant's Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit # 6 and 7) Denial 

of mandamus was the excuse eventually used.  One case very much on point,

Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F. 3d 1491, 1495 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) was glossed 

over by this district court.  The 11th Circuit "recognized an exception 

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, when the plaintiff has no 

reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings."

Biddulph, 1495 n.1.   Plaintiff never was allowed any opportunity to 

raise any federal claim in state proceedings.

   Federal courts usually do not leave election matters before a state 

court in many cases when a U.S. constitutional right is asserted.  

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059 illustrates how 

Rooker-Feldman is ignored in such cases.  In the facts of the case, 

Burdick, 112 S.Ct. 2061, 2062, it is related how the case complaining

about a state election was filed in federal district court, overruled 

by the appellate court and sent back to the Hawaii state court for 

determination.  Upon the Hawaii Supreme Court's determination, back it 

went to the district court, then up the federal court system to the 

appellate level, then eventually the U.S. Supreme Court.  Rooker-Feldman 

was never, ever invoked in such an election matter, even though the state 

court system actually did indeed extensively determine the matter in 

question.

   Appellant should not be penalized using Rooker-Feldman as an excuse 

for not hearing this case because Plaintiff actually obeyed Missouri 

election law, went up the judicial chain-of-command and gave the state 

court system a chance to hear the matter -- and they refused.

4.   The right of citizens to create and develop new political 

parties derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 

advances the constitutional interest of like-minded voters to 

gather in pursuit of common political ends, thus enlarging all 

voters' opportunities to express their own political preferences.  

Therefore a State may limit a new parties' access to the ballot 

only to the extent that a sufficiently weighty state interest 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892   11      Appellant's Brief

justifies the restriction.  Any severe restriction must be narrowly 

drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Norman v. 

Reed, 112 S.Ct. 698, 701, quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 

Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 186.  Even the Missouri court system 

sometimes recognizes it has a duty to apply this strict scrutiny test 

to identify a compelling state interest. See State ex. rel. Coker-Garcia

v. Blunt, 849 S.W.2d 81, 85.  "For more than two decades this Court has 

recognized the constitutional right of citizens to create and develop 

new political parties.  The right derives from the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments and advances the constitutional interest of like-minded 

voters to gather in pursuit of common political ends, thus enlarging the 

opportunities of all voters to express their own political preferences." 

Id., 84 quoting  Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94, 

103 S.Ct. 1564, 1572.

   Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by 

Appellee/Defendants' refusal to place his name on the ballot once he had 

received the Newton County Libertarian Party nomination.  If the Missouri 

court system and the District Court had ever been interested in doing

their jobs, instead of trying to evade their responsibilities, then this 

matter need never have had to come to the attention of this Appellate 

Court.

5. Article 4  4 of the U.S. Constitution guarantees "to every State in 

this Union a Republican Form of Government."  In many cases the federal 

court system glibly attaches a "nonjusticiable" tag on this matter to 

evade its responsibility.  "In most of the cases in which the Court has 

been asked to apply the Clause, the Court found the claims presented to 

be nonjusticiable under the "political question" issue. New York v. 

U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2432, 2433 (1922).  However, the Supreme Court 

has not held that the raising of this issue is nonjusticiable as a 

matter of course, but that it should be decided upon its merits. "Much 

confusion results from the capacity of the 'political question' label 

to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry.  Deciding whether a 

matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another 

branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds 

whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise 

in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of the 

Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate 

this requires no less than to analyze 


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892   12      Appellant's Brief

representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that 

make up the political question doctrine." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 

210-11. 82 S.Ct. 691, 706,707.  A Republican form of government has 

been defined as being by representatives chosen by the people.  (Black's 

Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Republican government).  If Missouri 

election officials are to usurp this function by using their office and 

power to regulate elections to instead refuse to allow candidates to 

run for public office by refusing to place them on the ballot, then it 

is a duty of the federal court system to guarantee a republican form

of government when it has the authority and opportunity to do so.

6. The reason the Appellee/Defendant election officials refused to place 

Appellant/Plaintiff's name on the general election ballot after 

Plaintiff sought and got the nomination from his political party 

nominating committee is that as members of the major political parties 

Defendants do not want upstarts like Plaintiff from small political

parties running candidates at the last minute in general elections 

against otherwise entrenched incumbents in areas of de facto one-

majority-party rule.  This cowardly fear of political opposition by the 

major political parties acting through their election officials is at 

the heart of this case.  The `election laws' governing nominating 

committees in Missouri (RSMo 115.361, 115.363, 115.367, See Appellant's

Appendix & Addendum, Exhibit 5) were deliberately set up to favor the 

major political parties with replacement from their swarms of 

politicians when one of their candidates for an office is no longer 

available to run for that office.  The Republican Newton County 

Courthouse Clique and the Democratic State Gubbnmint Gang engaged 

themselves in a fit of lawlessness when Appellant/Plaintiff proposed to 

use `their election laws' as a means of running for public office, and 

they used `their' election officials and `their' courts to reflexively 

curtail such activity by Plaintiff and his political party.

   Of course, the federal court system should not help such self-serving 

political discrimination.  "A burden that falls unequally on new or 

small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its 

very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment.

It discriminates against those candidates and -- of particular 

importance -- against those voters whose political preferences lie 

outside the existing political parties." Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 

U.S. 780, 793-794, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1572.


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892   13      Appellant's Brief

   

    The federal court system has no business protecting the existing 

major political parties from election competition from Plaintiff and his 

small political party even when Appellee/Defendants claim such an 

asserted interest for purposes of political stability.  Ibid., 103 

S.Ct. 1576-77.  "In Williams v. Rhodes we squarely held that protecting 

the Republican and Democratic Parties from external competition cannot 

justify the virtual exclusion of other political aspirants from the 

political area." Id., 1577 referring to Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 

at 31-32, 89 S.Ct. 5 at 10-11.

   Any "Such [a] state-imposed restriction is contrary to the 

"fundamental principle of our representative democracy," embodies in 

the Constitution, that "the people should choose who they please to 

govern them." U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1845.  

Election officials are supposed to be just engaged in the business of 

conducting elections, not influencing them by disallowing political

candidates to run for office by refusing to place them on the ballot.

   Appellant/Plaintiff has remarked several times in previous motions 

and briefs that for election officials to subvert the election process 

by disallowing candidates to be placed on the ballot is a technique no 

different in substance than what the German Nazis, Russian Communists,

and modern-day Serbia does in outlawing the political opposition from 

running its candidates.  The only difference is that the Nazis, 

Communists, and Serbs were more far honest about their motivations and 

the end results of their actions then Appellees/Defendants.



   Wherefore, Appellant/Plaintiff asks this Appellant Court to remand 

this case back to the District Court for Trial on the basis of 

Appellant's Arguments 1-3, or, in the alternative, to rule in Appellant's 

favor on the basis of Appellant's Arguments 4-6 and hold a special 

election for the office of Sheriff of Newton County and award Appellant

his expenses in bringing this case to a final solution.
                              
              -s- Martin Lindstedt
             ___________________________________
            Martin Lindstedt, Appellant/Plaintiff
        338 Rabbit Track Road, Granby, Missouri 64844


_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    14     Appellant's Brief

                   Certificate of Service


   Two copies of  this Appellant brief was mailed August 23, 1997 to 

Appellant: Mark E. Long, as counsel for Defendants Secretary of State 

Rebecca M. Cook and State of Missouri, c/o The Missouri Attorney 

General's Office, Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.

   Two copies of this Appellant brief was mailed August 23, 1997 to: 

Wendy Garrison, as counsel for Kay Baum, Newton County Clerk, c/o 

Prosecuting Attorney's office, Newton County Courthouse, 101 S. Wood, 

Neosho, Missouri, 64850.


               -s- Martin Lindstedt
               _______________________________
                      Martin Lindstedt
                       (417) 472-6901















_______________________________________________________________________
Lindstedt v. Baum et. al., Appeal # 97-2892    15     Appellant's Brief

                  _________________________
                     Appeal No. 97-2892
                  _________________________
                              
                      MARTIN LINDSTEDT,
                              Appellant,
                              
                             v.
                              
                     KAY BAUM, et. al.,
                              Appellees
                  _________________________

               Appellant’s Appendix & Addendum
                              
    Under Rule 30A, 8th Circuit Rules of Appellate Procedure
   (Under Rule 30A(a)(4)Pro Se Appeals says the entire record is
   available for review.  Therefore Pro Se Appellant should not
   have to prepare entire record for this Appendix.  However,
   Rule 30A(d) Addendum lists some papers that should be
   enclosed for easy reference by this Court and Appellant will
   comply and add some necessary references and exhibits for
                   this appellate review.)
                              
                          Contents
                              
1. Western District of Missouri U.S. District Court Judgement of 
   April 28, 1997
2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider of May 8, 1997
3. District Court’s Order Denying Reconsideration of Judgement of 
   June 4, 1997
4. Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal of July 3, 1997

                          Exhibits

5. Copies of pages from 1996 Missouri Election Laws, Chapter 115, a 
publication of Rebecca M. Cook, Secretary of State of Missouri, one of 
the Defendants/Appellees. Pages 37-38, covering RSMo § 115.327 to 115.333,
and Pages 41-42, RSMo § 115.359 to 115.363 and 115.365.
6. Copy, Missouri Supreme Court’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus and Judicial Review of Election Law of Oct. 18, 1997.
7. Copy, Letter from Clerk, Missouri Supreme Court advising that Plaintiff 
had received his final judicial review of the matter in the Missouri court 
system.

.

Commentary: This is a copy of the brief submitted to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on August 23, 1997. It obeyed all the local court rules and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. It was presented with a blue folder because I'm the Appellant/Plaintiff.

The basic question I wanted to present is how can the U.S. pretend to have and be a republican form of government if they refuse to allow candidates on the ballot under one guise or another of superficial legality? As I have pointed out, this is but a mere pretense for covering up a despotism no different in substance, if not degree, than that of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. The main difference is that the Nazis and Communists were far more honest in informing people that if they didn't toe the gubbnmint line they couldn't run for office. This decaying gubbnmint is as tyrannical but far more dishonest.

.

Back to Lindstedt for Newton County Sheriff or
Back to Patrick Henry On-Line